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The Performance and Future of Mandatory Allocation of
Credit to Selected Sectors in the Nigerian Economy

J. A. Babalola and F. 0. Odoko*

The paper examines the performance and likely future trend of mandatory credit
allocation to selected sectors of the Nigerian economy. The result reveals that
during both the pre-SAP and the SAP years, performance was below target. In
terms offuture mandatory a/location ofcredit by banks, the paper notes that instead
o_f'prescribing the total amount by which banks can expand credit, discretion should
he given to banks to allow market forces to determine the a/location.

I. INTRODUCTION
Until June 1993 when Open Market Operations (OMO) were introduced as part
of the shift to the indirect method of monetary control, credit guidelines were the
major instrument of monetary policy of the Central Bank of Nigeria. There were
two major strands to its use. The first was the prescription of the total amount by
which banks can expand credit. The other strand was the allocation of credit to
various sectors in pre-determined proportions. Over the years, mandatory allocation
of credit to sectors has come under heavy criticism, particularly in an environment
of increasing deregulation and other financial sector reforms. This was as a result of
what is described as 'government failure', which had resulted in inefficiency and
misallocation of credit. Yet it will be misleading to generalize. The experience of
countries like Korea and Taiwan, which achieved rapid growth in GDP while still
permitting their governments to strongly influence credit allocation and interest
rates, calls into question the blanket recommendation for withdrawal of governments
from the financial system.
The objective of this paper is to throw some light on this controversy and to
contribute to the debate on whether financial deregulation would be consistent with
modified government presence.
Programmes of mandatory credit allocation attempt to intervene in the way banks
allocate credit for a number of reasons. Hitherto, the pattern of funds distribution
was mainly in favour of commerce to the neglect of agriculture and manufacturing.
•The authors are Assistant and Acting Assistant Directors of Research, Central Bank of Nigeria,
Abuja. The views expressed are those of the authors and are not necessarily shared by the Central
Bank of Nigeria.
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Hence, the monetary authorities attempt to control the banks, which incidentally
are the main channels through which surplus saving is made available to priority
sectors. Thus, in the case of industry, the objective was to promote investment and
rapid industrialization through the provision of finance. The need to raise output
and provide incentive for the adoption of new technologies informed the priority
accorded agriculture in credit allocation. In other cases, the need to generate
employment as well as provide affordable homes influenced the amount of credit
directed to small enterprises and the housing sector. Recently, the inclusion of export
on the priority sector was based on the need to bridge the period between production
and payment and provide incentive for the export sector. Again, from the point of
view of balance of payments, it is desirable for banks to extend loans to export promotion.
The major conclusion of the study is that mandatory allocation of credit as it is
currently practised should be discontinued. Instead, development finance
institutions should be strengthened to enable them channel credit to the directly
productive sectors of the economy, particularly, agriculture, manufacturing and
exports. The role of government is to set reasonable targets and ensure that rewards
are based on performance, in line with the Korean experience. This is based on the
evidence that each time the prescribed ratios were raised, performance and
compliance improved. The process of change should be carefully planned. We
suggest that the affected development financial institutions should be revamped in
the next two to three years and thereafter the involvement of commercial and
merchant banks in directed credit should be removed. The rest of the paper is
organised as follows. In part II, a review of existing literature is undertaken to
provide insight into the concept, rationale, form and targets of mandatory credit
allocation. The relative effectiveness of the strategy is assessed, including the various
criteria used in such assessment. Part III is devoted to reviewing the experience of
selected countries in credit allocation and drawing useful lessons therefrom. In
part IV, the Nigerian experience is examined, setting out the specific objectives of
policy and relating actual data with the targets. Based on the findings in part IV,
consideration is given to the need to continue or discontinue the programme in part
V. The paper is summarized and the conclusions stated in part VI.

II. REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Monetary credit allocation is one of the direct instruments of monetary
management. It means restricting or precluding banks from lending for certain
purposes regarded as less essential or encouraging the flow of credit to sectors of
desired activity (Tomori, 1974). Directed credit programmes take various forms,
including lending requirements imposed on banks, refinancing schemes, loans at
preferential interest rates, credit guarantees and lending by development finance
institutions (World Bank, 1989).
The targets of mandatory credits vary from country to country and include
manufacturing, agriculture, small and medium scale firms, exports, under-developed
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regions, housing and indigenous borrowers. The use of mandatory credit allows
the composition of credit to be influenced. The rationale for government's
intervention is based on the argument that banks will not allocate funds to those
projects for which social returns are the highest. Also, government may consider
cert~in categories of loans undesirable, e.g. consumer credit. In an environment in
which the financial markets are not well developed, indirect control instruments
that rely on the behaviour of a large number of operators require passage of time
before the effects are felt. There is also the issue of the precision of the instruments.
It is argued that direct control policies are more precise in their effects than indirect
action (Padoa-Schioppa, 1975). Mandatory credit allocation is however said to be
effective only in the case of imperfect substitutability. For instance, credit allocation
does not succeed when the various forms of credit are perfectly substitutable from
both the point of view of demand and that of supply. In other words, where funds
could be raised from other sources, such as the Stock Exchange, then mandatory
credit allocation may be inefficient. Similarly, credit allocation is also ineffective in
the case of perfect complementarity. In practice, mandatory credit allocation is
effective when it succeeds in influencing positively the output of the identified
priority sectors. For instance, in the study by Odedokun, it was found that directed
credit to manufacturing influenced manufacturing production while all the others
were ineffective (Odedokun, 1981).
The operation of mandatory credit has been criticized on several grounds. First,
it is argued that because both the lenders and borrowers find it profitable, they set
up under-the-counter deals thus finding a way round the measures and thereby
reducing their effectiveness. The financial system can and do create forms of
financing, categories of transacting or even types of financial institutions which
may lack the requisites necessary to be subject to administrative restraint yet basically
retain the same features as the transactions it was hoped to restrict. The development
of finance houses in Nigeria is a case in point. Beyond that, many banks have in the
past "doctored" their books to reflect compliance with credit guidelines. Critics of
mandatory allocation of credit argue that instead of being an advantage, the greater
precision obtained with direct controls indicates a loss of efficiency. It is further
argued that the burden of the allocation is inequitable, both from the point of view
of the financial institutions and the borrowers (Masera, 1971). Finally, it is argued
that in view of the fungibility of credit, it is one thing for an amount of credit flow to
go to the desired borrowers and another for the borrowers to use the credit for the
intended purposes (Odedokun, 1988; Bitros; 1981. Teriba, 1974).

III. CREDIT ALLOCATION: THE EXPERIENCE OF SELECTED
COUNTRIES
The experiences of four countries, namely, India, Brazil, Korea and Ghana, with
mandatory credit allocation, are highlighted below:
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India
Within the framework of its national plans, India is one of the countries that has
used mandatory credit allocation as a device for monetary control. The objective
has been to increase lending to priority sectors and underprivileged and neglected
sectors so as to enhance their contributions to the growth of the national economy.
In India, the Reserve Bank defines priority sectors to include: (a) agriculture (b)
small scale industries (c) industrial estates (d) road and water transport operators
(e) retail trade and small businesses (f) professionals and self-employed persons (g)
education (h) housing loans to weaker sectors. The Indian government intervenes
extensively in the allocative process both by directing commercial banks to lend to
priority sectors and by establishing specialized institutions such as development
banks to make priority loans.
In operationalising this policy, in 1985 for instance, the Reserve Bank set a target
of 40 per cent of credit to be channelled to the priority sectors. In addition, a subtarget was set for lending to agriculture as well as a stipulation that the ratio of
credit to deposit of rural and semi-urban branches of banks should not be less than
60 per cent. A review of the data showed that the targets were largely met. More
importantly, available data showed that the expansion of credit to priority sectors
reduced, the proportion of bank credit provided to medium and large industries
relative to total credit but did not significantly reduce the amount of real credit
available to the sub-sector from the banking sector. This was made possible by the
substantial increase in bank deposits during the period which enabled banks to
continue servicing the needs of non-priority borrowers while increasing their lending
to priority sectors.
The authorities1, however, remain committed to priority credit scheme but have
broadened the eligibility criteria and further reduced the subsidy element so as to
alleviate the burden on banks. Under the 1995 /96 budget proposals, banks will be
required to contribute a portion of the shortfall in their lending to the agricultural
credit targets to a special fund for rural infrastructure.
Korea

In Korea, the financial sector has traditionally played a key role as an instrument
of industrial policy based on preferential credit. Consequently, the sector has been
subject to extreme government regulation and control. Until the 1980s, commercial
banks had virtually no discretion over interest rates, lending policies, customer
services or other major areas of organization or operation.
It is the Bank of Korea (Central Bank) that establishes the general guidelines on
the efficient allocation of banking funds. The basic regulations prepared by the
Monetary Board in 1962 gave priority to industries producing daily necessities,
expanding job opportunities, or improving the balance of payments. The regulations
also required that 30 per cent or more of each bank's total loans be extended to small
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and medium enterprises. Thus, considerable portion of banking funds are earmarked
for use in selective financing for specified industries, especially those of strategic
importance to economic development such as the heavy chemical industries and
exports. The success which Korea recorded was because export performance was
the main criterion for allocation of additional funds. This way, the inefficiency
problem was avoided (Stiglilz, 1993). Repayment rates in Korea have been in excess
of 90 per cent. Another reason for the success is that Korea appears to have strong
institutional capacity for project design, appraisal and monitoring. Because of this,
directed credit has generally gone to projects that are credit-worthy and viable, and
funds have usually been utilized for the purpose for which they were allocated. In
the area of exports, one of the channels was concessional rediscounting of preshipment credit based on letters of credit arising from a firm export order. The
interest rates charged on export credits were lower than general loan rates by several
percentage points. Post-shipment long-term finance was provided by Korean ExportImport Bank. Policy-based lending peaked in the late 1970s and has since been
scaled down significantly. The changes have permitted the emergence of a less
regulated non-bank financial sector, and financial sector reforms are progressing,
albeit gradually. The reforms became necessary with the realization that the
development of the financial sector has lagged behind other sectors. Yet, directed
credit continues to supplement commercial banking.
Brazil

During the 1960s and 1970s, the Brazilian government ensured that priority sectors
and industries received ample credit for growth at rates they could afford to pay.
The objectives were to accelerate economic growth and development and maintain
or even increase the ownership and control of industry by private Brazilian firms.
The selective credit program involved the establishment of a variety of sectoral
and regional programs and institutions to channel credit selectively into high priority
purposes. Prominent among these programmes and institutions were the National
Economic Development Bank with augmented resources from taxes and the
counterpart of international loans, the Rural Credit Loans which channelled 10 per
cent of commercial bank. deposits into agricultural loans and the export credit
programme, National Housing Programme, with social security pension funds and
the durable goods financing with funds for the North East Development Program.
Ghana
During the 1960s and 1970s, the Bank of Ghana controlled _the volume of credit,
and banks were given directives to channel credit to certain key sectors of the
economy including the government itself. In addition, various development banks
were established by government to promote industry, agriculture and construction.
Since 1983 when financial sector reforms were introduced in Ghana, there have
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been tremendous changes. In 1988, a major retorm programme was introduced
with the objective, among others, of improving the efficiency of credit allocation.
The above review shows that mandatory credit allocation served the purpose of
directing financial resources to priority sectors particularly in India and Korea. In
Brazil, it served the additional nationalistic purpose of enabling Brazilian private
firms to maintain the ownership and control of their business which otherwise would
have been taken over by foreigners during the era of liberalization. It also came out
clearly that when bank deposits grow, mandatory credit allocation does not adversely
affect the availability of credit to non-priority sectors. Finally, the Korean experience
indicates that while the practice assisted in the development of the real sector of the
economy, it could hamper the growth of the financial sector. Another danger is that
compulsory sectoral allocation of credit by banks leads to compromise in credit
standards and consequently the emergence of non-performing loans (CBN, 1995).
This is because many of the banks may lack adequate capacity for project appraisal
and monitoring in the various sectors of the economy.

IV. NIGERIA'S EXPERIENCE OF MANDATORY CREDIT
ALLOCATION
The use of monetary credit allocation as policy instrument in Nigeria was dictated
by the need to ensure an adequate supply of credit to the productive sectors of the
economy. In July 1969, the Central Bank of Nigeria prescribed guidelines for the
banks with regard to permissible increase in credit and the sectoral distribution of
credit. The objective was to control credit expansion and to ensure that the bulk of
any increase in credit went to the preferred sectors (production and services) of the
economy. During the period covered in this analysis (1972-1975), the credit guidelines
stipulated the desired sectoral distribution of bank loans and advances as shown in
Tables 1 and 2.
The analysis of the available statistics is divided into two parts. The first part
deals with the pre-SAP era (1972 -1985), while the second part looks at developments
after the introduction of SAP (1986-1995). Apart from a few adjustments made mostly
in favour of the preferred sectors as a result of changes in policy, the proportions of
credit allocated to each sub-sector have been retained over time. Meanwhile, the
high priority sectors referred to in the paper are as obtains under the current
dispensation. On the other hand, 1976 is chosen as the starting point for merchant
banks because that was when statistics became available.

Sectoral Distribution Before SAP (1972 - 1985)
During the period under review, commercial banks' loans to the productive sector
averaged 40.7 per cent, about 8.7 percentage points lower than the stipulated average
target of 49 .4 per cent. When compared with the 1972 level of 48.0 per cent, achieved

1
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target was 7.3 percentage points lower. In this sector, the proportion of loans that
went to agriculture, manufacturing and exports were slightly lower than the
prescribed targets. The achieved targets were 5.6, 28.1 and 3.8 per cent for agriculture,
manufacturing and exports, respectively (see Table 1.)
On monthly basis, the share of agriculture throughout the years covered under
the review (1972-1985) were generally below the prescribed targets. The same
problem was observed in the allocations to other productive sectors like
manufacturing and exports. For example, allocation of credits to the manufacturing
sector were 25.7 per cent in 1972, 27.3 in 1975, 30.8 in 1980 and 26.5 per cent in 1985.
The relatively low levels of credit to the manufacturing sector during these periods
reflected the general problem of lack of willingness on the part of the banks to allocate
credits to non-profitable sectors of the economy.
This view is reinforced in the share of "others" in the total credits to the economy,
that is, the share of credits that went to other sectors of the economy regarded as
being viable and profitable. Commercial banks' loans and advances to "others"
continued to account for more than 50 per cent of the total loans and advances.
Between 1972 and 1978, the share of "others" in the system's loans and advances
was in the range of 52.0 and 56.0 per cent, while the shares between 1979 and 1985
were between 42.0 per cent and 51.0 per cent.
With regards to merchant banks' sectoral distribution of loans and advances,
between 1976 and 1985, the total credit to agriculture, solid minerals and
manufactur1ng averaged 3.8 per cent, 4.3 per cent and 36.6 per cent, respectively,
when compared with the prescribed average targets of 5.2, 5.5 and 39.7 per cent,
respectively. All the sectors experienced deviations from target in the range of 1.4,
1.2 and 3.1 per cent, respectively.
On yearly basis, merchant banks loans and advances to the agriculture,
manufacturing, solid minerals and export sub-sectors significantly fell short of the
prescribed minimum. In 1976, their total share was 35.6 per cent, a shortfall of 13.4
percentage points from the target. In 1979, 1981, 1983 and 1986 their shares were
47.0, 48.4, 38.6 and 52.1 per cent, respectively, reflecting shortfalls of 4.0, 3.6, 13.4
and 14.9 percentage points for the respective years.
Sectoral Distribution after SAP (1986-1995)
Between 1986 and 1995, commercial banks' loans and advances to the priority
sectors averaged 51.8 per cent, a shortfall of 3.6 percentage points from the prescribed
average target of 55.4 per cent for the period. On yearly basis, the monthly average
performance of the priority sectors in 1986 stood at 53.4 per cent, reflecting a shortfall
of 5.6 percentage points from the stipulated minimum target of 59.0 per cent for the
fiscal year. The shares of agriculture and manufacturing during the same period
were 11.8 and 41.6 per cent, respectively. From 1988 to 1991, loans and advances to
agriculture continued to be higher than the stipulated target. For example, in 1988,
loans to agriculture was 11.8 per cent, in 1990, 15.9 and 1991, 15.7 per cent. Loans to
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manufacturing, unlike agriculture, had consistently remained less than the stipulated
minimum. The share of this sub-sector stood at 30.1 per cent in 1988, 32.9 per cent
in 1991 and 40.2 per cent in 1995, compared with the stipulated minimum of 35.0,
35.0 and 42.0 per cent in 1988, 1991 and 1995, respectively. Solid minerals and exports
that used to feature regularly in the priority sectors from 1972 to 1985 disappeared
from 1986 to 1994 and reappeared in 1994 for exports and 1995 for solid minerals.
Their disappearance and reappearance may not be unconnected with the importance
government attaches to each of these sub-sectors of the economy.
Examining the performance of the merchant banks, it was observed that loans
and advances by the merchant banks to the priority sectors of the economy displayed
the same pattern of performance over the observed period (1986-1995). In 1986,
loans to priority sectors fell short of the stipulated minimum of 64.0 per cent by 11.7
percentage points, reflecting shortfalls of 0.8 and 10.9 percentage points for the
agriculture and manufacturing sectors, respectively (see Table 2). From 1988 to
1995, loans to the agriculture sub-sector remained higher throughout the period
than the stipulated minimum target, while the share of manufacturing too showed
slight deviation from the prescribed targets. Like the commercial banks, merchant
banks' loans and advances to the solid minerals and exports sub-sectors stopped in
1985 and reappeared in 1995.

V. THE FUTURE OF MANDATORY CREDIT ALLOCATION IN

NIGERIA
Given the objectives credit allocation is supposed to achieve, it can be said that
selective credit control policy has had limited success in the Nigerian economy. Our
aim in this part of the paper is to examine the need to continue or discontinue the
programme. In order to do that, we shall look at the effectiveness of selective credit
allocation since its inception in 1969.
The effectiveness of selective credit allocation policy can be measured in two
different ways. First, it can be measured through the increased flow of credit to the
priority sectors and the decrease in credit to non-preferred or undesired areas of the
economy. Secondly, it can be measured in terms of their effectiveness in increasing
investment or output in these sectors. The use of this second method requires the
availability of firm level data that relate financial flows to patterns of resource
utilization (Bitros, 1981). This is lacking at the moment.
Using our first method of measurement, it could be observed that the credit
allocation programme in Nigeria has succeeded in increasing the volume of credit
to the productive sectors than before 1969 when the programme was first introduced.
However, despite the increase in total credit to that sector, its impact on investments
and output has been very minimal. It is because of this that our analysis will be
based on the first method, since trying to evaluate the performance of selective credit
policy through its impact on investments and output is often faced with the problem
of isolating the impact of credit from other factors affecting investment and output.
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Given that credit allocation programme in Nigeria has increased the volume of
credit to the productive sectors over the years, it can be said that credit allocation
policies in Nigeria have been partially successful. This is because credit allocation
by commercial and merchants banks has continued to grow over the years, This
increase is however only in relation to the level of allocation in the productive sectors
before 1972, When compared with the annual stipulated targets for the period
under review, we observed that their allocations were below the stipulated minimum
requirements. On yearly basis, only merchant banks exceeded their annual targets
to the priority sectors from 1988 - 1994.
In view of the observations stated above, it is clear that credit to the priority sectors
has been increasing relative to the adjustment in the prescribed annual targets, That
is, whenever the prescribed target is adjusted upward, the total credit allocated to
the sectors too would increase to meet the increase in adjustment, The increase in
total credit has never met the expected targets, Therefore, it could be said that even
though the total amount of credit to the preferred sectors has been growing yearly,
the growth has remained consistently below the prescribed targets for each subsector as stated in the guideline,
The inability of the banks (commercial and merchant banks) to comply with the
stipulated targets in the guideline may be due to the fact that the banks see their
allocation of credit to, the priority sectors as a cost rather than as a benefit, This can
be explained by the fact that most banks would not, on their own, venture into
some areas of financing deemed highly preferable by the government, hence, the
need to impose selective credit policy, For example, the cost to the banks in complying
with the selective credit measures may be an additional cost That is, the cost of
training bank personnel to administer the credit programme to their customers and
keeping records on beneficiaries of the programme. The other being the cost of loss
of profit from other related areas that could have been invested in, Apart from the
cost to the bank, thj:!re are other costs of devoting resources to evading compliance
with the policy and inefficiencies associated with imposition of selective credit policy.
For any selective credit policy measure to succeed, it must not only be able to
channel funds into appropriate areas of the economy on long-term basis, but must
also allow a reasonable level of profitability to exist to make it possible for them to
compete for funds and thus maintain an adequate flow of funds to these sectors.
Therefore, market should be allowed to determine interest rate and allocation of
credit to sectors of the economy. This is because, as long as the ultimate objective of
the selective credit policy is to increase availability of credit in a particular use, it is
best to retain market-determined interest rate so that consumers, producers,
borrowers and lenders could use funds and resources at their disposal efficiently,
Government should adopt other mechanisms to ensure that credit is channelled to
the directly productive sectors of the economy, This involves strengthening
(revamping) the existing development finance institutions, particularly the Nigerian
Industrial Development Bank (NIDB), the Nigerian Bank for Commerce and
Industry, (NBCI), the Nigerian Agricultural and Cooperative Bank (NACB) and the
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Nigerian Export and Import Bank (NEXIM). These institutions have critical roles
to play in the rapid transformation of the Nigerian economy. For effectiveness,
however, there is a need for some change in their policies and operational procedures.
Foremost among these is that the board and top management of the institutions
should be appointed on merit rather than on political patronage. Secondly, targets
should be set for the institutions to meet, and performance should be used as a
basis for rewards and sanctions. This way, the management would be encouraged
to perform efficiently while government's efforts to influence selection of personnel
and investment decisions would also be discouraged. The institutions should strive
to build up alternative sources of finance in order to reduce their reliance on
government. In this way, the institutions can operate on the basis of financial,
economic and technical criteria rather than political criteria.
In addition, the monetary authorities must devise ways to ensure that the removal
of credit allocation does not result in excessive increase in consumer credit with all
its attendant inflationary effects. A number of incentives can be given to commercial
banks to induce them to lend to manufacturing and agriculture. Among such
incentives are: provision of data on borrowers' credit ratings; development of
infrastructure, particularly telecommunications, electricity and manpower
development. Others include the scaling down of the high reserve requirements on
deposits, and forced lending to the government at low real interest rates should be
reviewed. An important incentive is the deregulation of interest rates. This is in
spite of recent experience (1991-93) which witnessed the excessive rise in lending
rates while interest on deposits remain virtually unchanged; and the negative impact
on small scale enterprises (SSE). Once there is macroeconomic stability, particularly
low inflation rate and tolerable level of fiscal deficits, the interest rate structure is
expected to be stable. The negative impact of a deregulated interest rate regime on
Small Scale Enterprises can then be ameliorated by a revamped Nigerian Bank for
Commerce and Industry and similar schemes.
The reluctance of many commercial banks towards lending to the agriculture
and manufacturing sectors is traceable to the level of risk associated with such
lending; that is, the probability that the borrower will default on the loan granted.
This risk can be minimized in several ways. One way is through stringent evaluation
of loan applications, which can be aided through the provision of data on borrower's
credit rating. This service could be undertaken by a research unit funded by the
Bankers' Committee or even the Central Bank of Nigeria. The unit we are suggesting
should be similar to the US-based Business Environmental Risk Intelligence which
undertakes studies on country risk for foreign creditors and investors to acquire at
a fee. In addition, the Agriculture Credit Guarantee Scheme Fund (ACGSF) can be
strengthened, expanded and even extended to the manufacturing sector. The
guarantee may be targeted at sub-sectors such as engineering and production for
exports. By this, banks will be guaranteed against losses on certain types of loans
disbursed to the selected sectors so as to encourage continued participation of banks
in the scheme. This type of guarantee will fill the gap between the loan maturities
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with which the banks may be willing to lend and the longer loans needed for
sustaining the growth in the economy. For example, the need of a loanee may be a
loan of 15-year maturity but the banks may only be willing to lend for 10 years. The
guarantee will therefore be used to cover the remaining five years. The details
similar to the ACGSF can be worked out. In any case, the guarantee should be less
than the full value of the loan so as to retain the interest of the banks in protecting
their stake.

VI.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In this paper, we have reviewed the performance and the likely future trend in
mandatory credit allocation. The major objective of introducing mandatory credit
allocation was to affect the composition of credit in ways which would bring the
distribution of credit more in line with the social optimum. Other objectives include:
to promote industrialization, generate employment, provide affordable homes and
to boost export drive. The experiences of four countries were reviewed and broad
lessons drawn therefrom. The experience of Korea is particularly instructive. The
role played by government-directed credit in the development of Korean industry
is widely acknowledged. The experience of Brazil is similar even if less spectacular.
In the case of Nigeria, the need to ensure adequate supply of credit to the productive
sector of the economy was the major motivation for the introduction of directed
credit. It took the form of the Central Bank setting not only the limits of permissible
rate of credit expansion but specifying allocation to various sectors of the economy.
Initially, the sectors were sixteen but the number was gradually reduced to four
following financial sector reforms which government embarked upon. Beginning
in 1993, all banks whicl) were classified as healthy are no longer subject to limits on
credit expansion. The analysis of Nigerian data showed that on both the pre-SAP
and the SAP years, performance was below target. However, it is noteworthy that
each time the target ratios were raised the performance of banks was better. It was
not possible to analyse the ultimate effect of directed credit because of the absence
of data at the firm level.
In terms of the future of mandatory allocation of credit by commercial and
merchant banks, our view is that discretion should be given to the banks to allow
market forces to determine the allocation. It is suggested that government should
adopt other mechanism to ensure that credit is channelled to the directly productive
sectors of the economy; including the revamping of the development finance
institutions and increasing the incentives to commercial and merchant banks to
induce lending to manufacturing and agriculture. Some of the incentives include
provision of credit ratings on borrowers, development of basic infrastructure,
particularly telecommunications and electricity, and lowering of reserve
requirements. By concentrating on the development finance institutions, supervision
would be better and it will be easier to trace the credit flows to firm level beneficiaries.

Table 1
Sectoral Distribution of Commercial Banks Loans and Advances1
1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

4.0

4.0

4.0

6.0

6.0

6.0

6.0

6.0

8.0

8.0

8.0

10.0

Prescribed Percentage
Agriculture
2

Solid Minerals

4.0

4.0

4.0

2.0

2.0

2.0

2.0

2.0

2.0

2.0

2.0

2.0

Manufacturing

30.0

30.0

30.0

30.0

30.0

30.0

32.0

36.0

36.0

36.0

36.0

36.0

Exports

10.0

10.0

10.0

10.0

6.0

6.0

6.0

6.0

5.0

5.0

3.0

2.0

Total (High Priority)

48.0

48.0

48.0

48.0

44.0

44.0

46.0

50.0

51.0

51.0

49.0

50.0

Others

52.0

52.0

52.0

52.0

56.0

56.0

54.0

50.0

49.0

49.0

51.0

50.0

2.4

3.1

3.1

2.5

3.8

3.9

4.9

6.5

6.8

7.2

7.2

8.2

-1.6

-0.9

-0.9

-3.5

-2.2

-2.l

-1.l

0.5

-1.2

-0.8

-0.8

·l.8

Monthly Average Perfonnanci
Agriculture
Deviation from Target
Solid Minerals

1.9

1.6

1.2

1.3

0.9

1.2

0.9

1.0

0.9

0.9

0.9

1.0

Deviation from Target

-2.l

-2.4

-2.8

-0.7

-1.l

-0.8

-1.l

-1.0

-1.l

-1.l

-1.l

-1.0

Manufacturing

25.7

24.0

28.4

27.3

29.4

27.8

27.6

29.0

30.8

30.9

30.5

28.4

Deviation from Target

-4.3

•6.0

-1.6

-2.7

-0.6

-2.2

-4.4

-7.0

-5.2

-5.l

-5.5

-7.6

Exports

11.0

10.l

8.2

6.1

3.7

3.1

2.0

1.7

1.5

1.4

1.2

1.1

1.0

0.1

-1.8

-3.9

-2.3

-2.9

-4.0

-4.3

-3.5

-3.6

-1.8

-0.9

Deviation from Target

1. While the preferred sectors have continued to vary over time with changes in policy, the 'high priority sectors' referred to are as obtains under the
current dispensation.

2. Prior to 1994 when Solid Minerals became a separate comp'\ment, the Mining and Quarr~ing subsector was used as proxy.

Table 1 (cont'd)
Sectoral Distribution of Commercial Banks Loans and Advances1
Annual
Average
Performance

Prescribed Percentage
Agriculture
Solid Minerals2
Manufacturing
Exports
Total (High Priority)
Others

Monthly Average Petfonnance
Agriculture

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995 1972-1985 1986-1995

10.0
9.0
36.0
2.0
57.0
43.0

12.0
9.0
35.0
2.0
58.0
42.0

15.0

15.0

15.0

15.0

15.0

15.0

15.0

15.0

18.0

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

44.0

35.0

35.0

35.0

35.0

35.0

35.0

35.0

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

59.0
41.0

50.0
50.0

50.0
50.0

50.0
50.0

50.0
50.0

50.0
50.0

50.0
50.0

50.0
50.0

42.0
10.0
70.0
30.0

18.0
5.0
42.0
10.0
75.0
25.0

7.0
3.4
33.1
5.9
49.4
50.6

15.6
0.5
37.3
2.0
55.4
44.6

8.8

10.0

11.8

12.9

15.3

15.3

15.9

15.7

14.8

16.4

16.9

17.9

5.6

15.3

3.2

0.6

28.1

34.2

3.8

1.7

Deviation from Target

-1.2

-2.0

-3.2

-2.1

0.3

0.3

0.9

0.7

-0.2

1.4

-1.1

-0.1

Solid Minerals

15.8

15.5

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

5.7

6.8

6.5

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.7

Manutacturing

27.5

26.5

41.6

29.1

30.1

30.7

30.3

32.9

32.6

32.8

37:8

40.2

Deviation from Target

-8.5

-8.5

-2.4

-5.9

-4.9

-4.3

-4.7

-2.1

-2.4

1.8

-4.2

-1.8

1.1

1.0

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

8.6

8.3

-0.9

-1.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

-1.4

-1.7

Deviation from Target

Exports
Deviation from Target

Annual
Average
Performance

1. While the preferred sectors have continued to vary over time with changes in policy, the 'high priority sectors' referred to are as obtains under the
current dispensation.
2. Prior to 1994 when Solid Minerals became a separate component, the Mining and Quarrying subsector was used as proxy.

Table 2
Sectoral Distribution of Merchant Banks Loans and Advances 1

Agriculture
Solid Minerals2
Manufacturing
Exports
Total (High Priority)
Others

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

6.0

6.0

4.0

5.0

5.0

5.0

5.0

5.0

2.0

2.0

2.0

3.0

3.0

3.0

3.0

3.0

36.0

36.0

40.0

39.0

41.0

41.0

41.0

41.0

5.0

5.0

5.0

4.0

3.0

3.0

3.0

49.0

49.0

51.0

51.0

52.0

52.0

51.0

51.0

49.0

49.0

48.0

48.0

1984

1985

1986

5.0

6.0

8.0

17.0

17.0

-

41.0

41.0

56.0

3.0

3.0

3.0

-

52.0

52.0

66.0

67.0

64.0

48.0

48.0

34.0

33.0

36.0

Monthly Average Performance

Agriculture
Deviation from Target

1.7

2.9

2.7

3.0

4.9

4.6

4.1

4.0

4.4

5.7

7.2

-4.3

-3.l

-1.3

-2.0

-0.l

-0.4

-0.9

-1.0

-0.6

-0.3

-0.8

Solid Minerals
Deviation from Target

2.3
0.3

3.7

2.2
0.2

1.6
-1.4

1.8
-1.2

1.7
-1.3

1.2
-1.8

0.9

13.2

14.7

-

1.7

-2.l

-3.8

-2.3

0.0

Manufacturing
Deviation from Target

30.9

34.5

36.7

42.4

41.9

42.1

40.7

33.6

31.9

31.6

45.1

-5.1

-1.5

-3.3

3.4

0.9

1.1

-0.3

-7.4

-9.l

-9.4

-10.9

Exports
Deviation from Target

0.7

0.9

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.1

0.1

0.1

0.1

-

-4.3

-4.l

-5.0

-4.0

-2.9

-3.0

-2.9

-2.9

-2.9

-2.9

0.0

1. While the preferred sectors have continued to vary over time with changes in policy, the 'high priority sectors' referred to are as obtains under the
current dispensation.
2. Prior to 1994 when Solid Minetals became a separate component, the Mining and Quarrying subsector was used as proxy.

Table 2 (cont'd)
Sectoral Distribution of Merchant Banks Loans and Advances1
Annual
Average
Performance

Annual
Average
Performance

1976-1985

1986-1995

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

10.0

10.0

10.0

10.0

10.0

10.0

10.0

13.0

13.0

5.2

10.4

0.0

0.0

-

-

-

-

-

-

5.0

5.5

0.5

40.0

40.0

40.0

40.0

40.0

40.0

40.0

45.0

45.0

39.7

42.6

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

12.0

12.0

3.7

2.4

Total (High Priority)

50.0

50.0

50.0

50.0

50.0

50.0

50.0

70.0

75.0

54.1

55.9

Others

50.0

50.0

50.0

50.0

50.0

50.0

50.0

30.0

25.0

45.9

44.1

Agriculture
Deviation from Target

7.7
-2.3

11.5
1.5

14.3
4.3

14.6
4.6

14.7
4.7

15.1
5.1

14.7
4.7

13.9
0.9

14.0
1.0

3.8

12.8

Solid Minerals
Deviation from Target

-

-

-

-

-

-

0.4

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

3.5
-1.5

4.3

0.0

Manufacturing
Deviation from Target

38.0
-2.0

46.3
6.3

40.5
0.5

42.7
2.7

43.4
3.4

46.2
6.2

45.0
5.0

431
-1.9

45.0
0.0

36.6

43.5

Exports
Deviation from Target

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

0.0

11.6
-0.4

2.2

0.0

10.3
-1.7

0.2

0.0

Agriculture
Solid Minerals /2.

Manufacturing
Exports

Monthly Average PerformancE

-

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

-

1. While the preferred sectors have continued to vary over time with changes in policy, the 'high priority sectors' referred to are as obtains under the
current dispensation.
2. Prior to 1994 when Solid Minerals became a separate component, the Mining and Quarrying subsector was used as proxy.
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NOTES
1. IMF: Recent Economic Developments: India 1995/96.
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Export Processing Zone Programmes:
Lessons for Nigeria from Other Countries
E. B. Hogan and E. A. Onwioduokit*

The monumental success of the export-oriented South-East Asian countries has
engendered a shift in emphasis among other developing countries towards exportoriented development strategy in recent times. This paper examines the export
processing programmes in Nigeria, drawing from the experiences ofother countries
where the programme is operational. The analysis confirms that the nature and
extent of incentives available in Nigeria's EPZ scheme compares favourably with
those provided by similar schemes elsewhere. However, the same cannot be said of
infrastructural facilities such as roads, railways and communication. The need for
improvement in these facilities is emphasized. Also, security, which is a derivative
of political stability as well as consistency in government policies, are highlighted
among the necessary conditions for a successful EPZ programme in Nigeria.

I.

INTRODUCTION

The disappointing performance of the import-substitution industrialization
strategy has led to a shift of emphasis among developing countries towards an
export-oriented development. Current economic reform programmes emphasize
trade reform policies as being essential for developing countries to become integrated
into the world economy. Most academic literature on trade policy reform has, on
the whole, adopted an all-embracing approach to trade reforms with little attention
to the requisite piece-meal policy measures and operational details. The trade policy
measures include exchange rate policy, export policy and import policy. Due to the
monumental success of the export-oriented South-East Asian countries, some
analysts have focused attention on export policies. This emphasis on exports is due
in part to the numerous studies which have demonstrated that the export-oriented
strategy has produced not only rapid export growth but also rapid economic growth
(Warr, 1989). One of the effective tools in the export promotion strategy which has

*Expressed views are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official position of
the Central Bank of Nigeria. Messr-s E. B. Hogan and E. A. Onwioduokit are Economists in the
International Economic Relations Department, CBN.
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been a feature of the South-East Asian countries is the establishment of Export
Processing Zones (EPZs). Given the success of EPZs in these countries, other
developing countries have considered their establishment as a strategy to follow.
The question to be asked is how realistic is the attainment of this "emulative vision"
given the diverse economic backgrounds of most developing countries. In specific
terms, how can Nigeria, presently embarking on the EPZ programme, benefit from
the experiences of other countries with operational EPZs? Responding to these
questions largely form the purpose of this paper.
Export Processing Zones are special enclaves usually (but not always) fenced in
an area of 10 to 30 hectares which are outside a country's nol'tllal customs barriers,
within which firms, mostly foreign companies, enjoy a special status in terms of
imports and exports, taxation, provision of infrastructure and a liberal regulatory
environment. From a policy perspective, EPZs are set up to insulate exporters from
the infrastructural and policy inadequacies of the economy at large. Their attraction
lies in their ability to enable countries to attract foreign investment, diversify and
increase exports and create employment in special enclaves without pursuing
economy-wide and comprehensive liberalization policies which might be difficult
and prolonged.
Analytical consideration apart, the performance of EPZs in some countries is
compelling enough for other countries to follow. According to the World Bank, in
Malaysia, "the Export Processing Zones were crucial to the successful combination
of import substitution and export promotion. By 1980, 20 per cent of manufactured
exports originated from EPZs." 1 Also for China, during the period 1979 - 1989,
direct foreign investment in the (special) economic zones reached US$4.1 billion.
Spill-over from the zones has boosted growth in the provinces that host them. In
1980 -1985, industrial output grew at an annual rate of 16 per cent in Guangdong
(an EPZ province) and 14.7 per cent in Fijian (also an EPZ province) compared to 6.9
per cent nationwide." Given this evidence of the positive contributory role of EPZs,
their economic logic, performance, impact, static and dynamic effect, their
applicability in other economies are all legitimate areas of research.
This paper focuses on the economic logic, performance and impact of EPZs. In
the EPZs evaluation, an important distinction is made between EPZs' static aspect
of costs and benefits and the dynamic effects which relate to policy evolution and
industrialization. An important part is the surveying of studies done on the
performance, impact, costs and benefits of EPZs in countries such as Taiwan and
Mauritius. This survey is intended to discern and highlight features and aspects of
EPZs which are necessary for their success. An appraisal of Nigeria's current
experiments is made in order to ascertain areas that need fine-tuning so as to reap a
greater benefits for the country.
There is very little amount of previous research work on EPZs. Indeed, given
their prevalence in developing countries, their contribution to economic growth and
their continued popularity, past research on EPZs is not commensurate with their
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importance. In Nigeria for instance, there is a conspicuous absence of research work
in this area. The present study intends to fill s1.1.ch observed gap. The specific
objectives of this study therefore are to:
(i) outline the theoretical foundations of EPZs anq establish their economic logic;
(ii) survey the studies done on EPZs in countries cited earlier in order to evaluate
their role in the respective economies; and
(iii) appraise the Nigerian EPZ experiment in the light of experiences of other
countries in order to make policy recommendation for the purpose of finetuning the existing policy for greater efficiency and enhanced growth.
The remaining part of this study is arranged as follows. Part II contains a review
of theory /literature on EPZs. In part Ill, an overview and examination of
contemporary trend of EPZs is presented. Part IV dwells on historical antecedent of
EPZ in Nigeria. The section alsoexamines the possible socio-economic impacts of
EPZ on Nigeria; s economy. Global evaluation and examination of countries' specific
experiences with EPZis done in Part V. Part VI contains policy recommendations
and some concluding remarks.

IT. LITERATURE REVIEW
In terms of the theoretical studies on EPZs, the dearth of research in this area is
striking. Apart from attempts by Hamada (1974), Hamilton and Svensson (1982), a
comment on Hamada's work by Rodriguez (1976) and a paper on the theory of free
economic zones by Grubel (1982), there are no other specific theoretical articles on
EPZs. Among the above, Grubel alone attempts to formulate a theory ot EPZs
through his work on trade creation and locational trade diversions (an import from
the analysis of customs union). A considerable amount of research (though still
modest in comparison to other trade policy issues) has been confined to empirical
work in various EPZ host countries. These include Alter (1991) on Mauritius, Warr
(1989) on Korea, Malaysia,' Philippines and Indonesia, Sit (1985) on China and
Spinanger (198~) on Singapore. The thrust of these studies has been on the static
effects of EPZs basically covering the costs and benefits directly emanating from
EPZs or the linkages between the EPZs and the host-country.
The studies on static impact have looked at foreign exchange earnings,
employment generation, technology transfer, and the renumeration of the factors of
production. In a few of the articles, an attempt is made fo link EPZs to the general
economy-wide policy. The World Bank (1992) has produced a report which outlines
its experiences with EPZs. According to the World Bank, EPZs' main role is as.a
transitional instrument, enabling a country to enter into world markets while
undertaking policy reforms to shift it toward an outward-oriented development.
In this way, the World Bank opined that EPZs should not be a substitute for economic
reforms. In particular, the success of an EPZ in an adjusting reforming economy
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has a positive demonstration effect on the feasibility of an outward-oriented
development strategy. The EPZs become a reform laboratory where the future
economy towards which reforming countries are slowly advancing can be seen in
operation. The EPZ success has had a significant positive impact on trade policy in
Malaysia, Sir Lanka and Taiwan. On the other level is the compatibility of the policy
content of an outward-orientation reform with the policy environment under which
EPZs are successful. In this regard, it has been noted that competitive exchange
rates and macroeconomic srability correlate with EPZs successes (World Bank, 1993).
Indeed, EPZs perform well if they are part of a general economy-wide trade and
macroeconomic reform policy. In this way, EPZs become an instrument which is a
rational component for inclusion in the package of instruments to re-orient an antiexport biased economy. EPZs become part of the economic structural adjustment
programme.
The objective of looking at the theoretical foundation of EPZs follows from the
pre-position that EPZs are justifiable on the basis of economic theory and
development imperatives. From the perspectives of the investors in EPZs, the
behaviour of the "footloose" manufacturing firm provides the economic foundation.
The EPZs exploit the international mobility of capital goods owned by the "footloose"
manufacturer and combine them with domestic labour to produce traded goods.
This process can be seen as an indirect way of exporting labour. The firms move
their capital to countries in which it can earn the highest rate of return.
The activities in EPZs produce final goods using three kinds of inputs namely,
traded intermediate inputs, capital goods and labour. Over time, competition in
product markets push down prices of goods produced thus lowering the rate of
return on capital used in producing those goods. In this case, unit labour cost, as
distinct from unit capital cost, becomes an important factor in the decision of locating
the production of goods. Eventually, there is a gradual migration of the
manufacturing process from rich to poor countries. From the perspective of host
economy, the basic logic of using EPZs lies in the fact that the structure of economic
incentives and production costs during import substitution impinge negatively on
export profitability. Dismantling overnight the domestic oriented incentive structure
might be costly. Thus, the logic of EPZs is the creation of an area in which certain
conditions and policies which the government is unwilling or unable to provide on
an economy-wide basis operate. Thus, an EPZ allows the government to create an
"enclave," isolated from the domestic economy within which export-oriented policy
initiatives can be accepted.
Several studies have been conducted on the performance and impact of EPZs
in various countries with the general conclusion that EPZs do achieve most of their
objectives and have a positive impact on the country's welfare. Numerous
approaches have been used on the study of the welfare impact of EPZs on the host
economy. According to Spinanger (1985) in analyzing the static impact of the EPZs
in Malaysia and the Philippines, employment, sales (exports), purchases (either
imports or from the host economy), and renumerations of factors of production
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have to be calculated. It is then assumed that a positive balance vis-a-vis the domestic
economy represents a net benefit to the economy, i.e. the investment in the EPZs
infrastructure is compensated for by recent wages and local purchases of capital
and intermediate goods as well as services. It is pointed out that static effects.can be
relatively easily measured but the dynamic effects of EPZs from which the important
and more permanent industrialization impulses are expected can only be broadly
outlined. Hence, in order to investigate the industrialization process, Spinanger
has analysed EPZs with respect to the structure of employment, production and
export as well as the factor intensity of production taking place therein.
Another approach is the enclave approach put forward by Warr. According to
Warr (1989), the benefit and cost of an EPZ as experienced by the host country's
citizens are compared to the hypothetical results of not having a zone. The foreign
owne,ship of the EPZ firms and their "offshore" nature lend themselves to an analysis
temt~ the "enclave approach" as used by Corden.
The' figure below illustrates its diagrammatic elements.
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>

Fig. 1.1: The Enclave Approach
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This approach considers:
(i)
(ii)

the flow of goods between the EPZ and the rest of the world;
the flow between the EPZ and the host country.

The flow in (ii) are relevant for evaluating the welfare impact of the zone hut the
, flow in (i) are not. Thus, the EPZ is an isolated part or foreign enclave in the
domestic economy. An illustration of this approach is provided by the issue of
transfer pricing, If, for instance, there are no profit taxes on EPZ firms, the transfer
pricing influences whether a firm's profit is recorded in the host country or elsewhere.
However, as far as profit is earned by the EPZ firms, whether it is realized in the
host country or somewhere else and whether it is remitted or retained by the firm is
irrelevant for the economic welfare of the host country. If profit is taxable, however,
the transfer pricing affects the size of these taxes and becomes highly relevant.
According to Warr, the net outcome of real and financial flows as shown in the
figure above does not necessarily raise welfare in the host country. Hence, only a
detailed examination of the costs and benefits can resolve this question. The
components of a benefit and cost analysis of EPZs are the foreign exchange earnings,
employment transfer, domestic sales, purchases of domestic goods, developments
and recurrent costs. Warr looked at the evidence from four Asian countries, namely,
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and Philippines. In the study, he used shadow prices to
evaluate EPZs and show that the contribution of each major benefit-cost categories
to the aggregate approximates present value of the EPZs.

III. EXPORT PROCESSING ZONES:
AN OVERVIEW AND CONTEMPORARY TREND
Governments in developed countries, newly industrialized countries (NICs) and
developing countries have promoted EPZs in various forms because they can serve as:
(i)

tools for helping their economies overcome the inability to generate an outv,ard
supply response;
(ii) sources of immediate employment; and
(iii) sources of foreign exchange earnings by inducing foreign direct investment.
The critical path for effectiveness requires certain policies to be in place and an
enabling environment to be created. These include:
(i)

realistic exchange rates and stable macroeconomic environment critical for all
manufactured export;
(ii) clear and well conceived policies towards foreign investment;
(iii) unrestricted access to duty-free imported inputs and capital goods and rapid,
iow-cost customs clearance for imports and exports;
(iv) no restrictions on foreign exchange for EPZ firm's export-related international
transactions;
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minimal regulating interference in the actions and transactions in the EPZs,
including freedom to hire and fire workers at low transaction a>Sts; and
(vi) appropriate location, generally in a major urban area, with suitable low-cost
labour, transport (major port,good roads, and an international airport), utilities
(electricity, water, sewage and reliable communications) and services
(maintenance, security).
(v)

The world's first full-fledged industrial estate was set up in 1896 as a private
commercial venture at Traffort Park in Manchester, England. What is generally
regarded today as the first EPZ in the U.S.A. _also began operations in 1896. The
first developing country to make use of publidy-funded industrial parks was Puerto
Rico in 1947. The first EPZ in a developing country was established at Kandla in
India in the mid-1960s, and the first EPZ in sub-Saharan Africa was created in
Mauritius in the year 1970.
In the past two decades, there has been a considerable evolution in the EPZ
concept. FU'St, unlike the traditional approach where EPZs were mnfined, the benefits
and advantages of EPZs have been extended to areas scattered throughout a country's
territory on which national and foreign firms are located. The aim has been to
promote specific types of economic activity regardless of location to achieve
integration with the national economy and to allow foreign firms to choose the
specific location for their activities. Some EPZs cover a very large area, as in the
case of the special economic zones in China. In other cases, a whole town or country
has free zone status.
In recent times, EPZs have become increasingly pof, ular in a number of developing
countries as an export policy instrument. EPZs are expected to have a demonstration
effect for attracting foreign investment to the country as a whole and for initiating
economy-wide export development policies.
In 1991,eighty-sixEPZs were in operation in twenty-sevendevelopingcountries
around the world. However, if the broader definition of EPZs is adopted to include
bonded factories, in addition to full-fledged industrial estates, the number of
developing countries with EPZ programmes would be put at forty--ttm;-e. In the
early 1980s, duty-free manufacturing for export took place mainly in industrial
estates offering full infrastructure and factory facilities. Mexico's bond factories
and the EPZ programme initiated in Mauritius were to suit specific business
environment of each country. For example, private zone development and operations have emerged as a successful initiative in a number of Caribbean countries. Nogales
shelter plan was introduced in Mexico as an alternative cUilled at reducing risk to
foreign manufacturers. Specific Economic Zones were developed in China as an
option for attracting foreign investment as well '.as for developing regional
infrastructure and services. While there are no specific EPZs in such countries as
Hong Kong and Singapore, the whole policy environment provides an attractive
package to investors
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The amventional industry mix of EPZs has experienced gradual changes over
the years. Many EPZs have initiated programmes diversifying away from simple
labour-intensive industry to more sophisticated technology fields. The newly
industrialized countries in particular have focused increasing attentioh over the
past decade on promoting high-tech enterprises such as science parks. There has
also been a change in the role of imports. The original intention was for industries
in EPZs to export their entire production. In recent times however, firms in most
EPZs are allowed to sell part of their output in the domestic market. The development
of an import function is mainly attributable to the practical difficulty of controlling
smuggling from EPZs into the host country and to pressure from national consumers
and foreign investors who are attracted by the potential profits from sale to the local
market.
Considering the large number of EPZs in operation, only some have been very
successful. Many lack a suitable investment climate, experience difficulties in
operating under complex laws and regulations or face ll181lagement problems,
inappropriate location and high costs. Inadequate understanding of the basic
preconditions for operating an EPZ and the role of EPZ as one of the options among
export policy instruments have led to more failures than successes. Countries in the
initial stages of zone development often also lack skilled personnel in managing
and promoting the zone.
As indicated earlier, the first EPZ in sub-Saharan Africa was created in Mauritius
in 1970. In the succeeding decade, others were set up in Senegal, Liberia and Ghana.
Subsequently, others were established in Zaire (1981), Togo (1989) and Madagascar
(1989). The most recent EPZs are those established in Cameroon and Kenya in 1990.
Six others have recently been initiated and or are under study in Benin, Comoros,
Malawi, Nigeria, Rwanda and Zimbabwe.
Not all of these EPZs have been so successful. Administrative hurdles, insufficient
promotion, inadequate infrastructure and minimum investment levels, among
others, have discouraged investors. Although the EPZs in Zaire and Ghana have
been established for a number of years, for example, they have not yet become fully
operational. This disappointing experience has led a number of African governments
to introduce changes in the legal status of the EPZs, accompanied by a relaxation of
the regulations governing their activities. This approach informed the more liberal
foreign investment policy being currently followed by many African countries.
Delocalization based on the belief that the potential benefit of a zone can be
maximized if it becomes integrated into the economy of the host country is one of
the new policy approaches being adopted. This approach tends to change the
composition of the output of EPZs with a growing emphasis on high value-added
products involving more sophisticated technological processes. The promotion of
local participation by encouraging greater involvement of nationals in the capital of
EPZ enterprises are other means of integrating EPZs with the economies of the
African countries.
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IV.

EXPORT PROCESSING ZONES IN NIGERIA: BACKGROUND

Nigeria's external sector policies witnessed a deliberate shift from import
substitution to export promotion, beginning in 1986. Prior to this period, policy
emphasis had been on how to ensure a favorable balance-Of payments position by
reducing imports. This was because from the period of the first positive oil price
shock in 1973/74, foreign exchange earnings from oil exports were taken as given .
while attention on the external sector was to ensure the use of oil export earnings to
finance import replacement programmes.
Thus, trade policies in Nigeria then protected focal manufacturing of industrial
raw materials and importation of intermediate capital imports. This import
substitution industrialiution strategy implies an inward looking trade regime, which
confers substantial protection on import competing manufacturing activities
(Robertson, 1981). It was in the mid-1980s, after the oollapse of the oil market, that
the negative consequences of these policies on the country's external sector
manifested largely. The strategy was sustained by a set of high import tariffs which
also taxed Nigeria's traditional exports (agriculture). The most pervasive of the
effects of this policy is its effect on real exchange rate. According to Oyejide (1986),
the real exchange rate that maintains external balance at a given rate of industrial
protection lower than equilibrium rate would prevail because an increase in import
tariffs corresponds, cereris paribus, to a decline of the real exchange rate. Thus, a
given level of protection to industry reduced the domestic prices of exportable sector
to the industrial and non-traded goods sector. To the extent that the oil boom lasted,
the economy was able to absorb these since the needed raw materials for the
operation of the industries could be imported. However, following the collapse of
the oil market, it became increasingly obvious to policy makers that such external
sector policies were wrong. An outward looking regime was substituted for the
import-substitution strategy.
A batteiy of policy reforms and incentives were segmentally put in place to
enmurage the production and export of non-oil tradeables. Nominal exchange rate
devaluation, strict fiscal discipline, controlled monetary expansion, among others,
were introduced to ensure real depreciation. These were followed by export
incentives which induded duty draw-back scheme, explicit export bonuses and the
introduction of anexportaeditagency named Nigeria Export-Import Bank (NEXIM).
To complement these incentives and to ensure that export promotion policy is linked
to skill acquisition, technology transfer and industrializ.ation, a Nigeria Export
Processing 2.one (EPZ) was proffered.
The idea of an Export Processing 2.one (EPZ) in Nigeria was first mooted in the
mid-1970s ~ta time when the EPZ concept was rapidly expanding in the Far East
and the Caribbean. However, it was only in 1979 that the Federal Government
accepted in principle that an EP'Z had a role to play in the development of the muntry.
_In the following year, 1980, the Federal Ministry of Industry commissioned a
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company, Gills Nigeria Limited, to carry out a feasibility study relating to the
establishment of an EPZ in Nigeria. The Consultants recommended that:
(i)
(ii)

for a start only one zone of 300 hectares should be established;
the first EPZ should be sited at Calabar and geared towards accommodating
petrochemical industries;
(iii) other free zones could be subsequently established; possible sites included
Ajaokuta, Ibadan, Sokoto and Makurdi;
(iv) responsibility for establishing and managing the EPZ programme should rest
with an autonomous body, the Nigerian Export Processing Zones Authority;
and
(v) the incentive package should provide for:
- 100% foreign ownership;
- relief from taxation and customs duties;
- efficient administrative procedure;
- good quality infrastructure;
- guarantees on the repatriation of capital and profits; arad
- foreign currency accounts for each investor to facilitate import and export
transaction.
Based on the positive indications of the report submitted in January 1990, the
, Nigerian Government requested the United Nations Industrial Development
Organization (UNIDO) to conduct a detailed study which would deal with the
question of establishing an Export Processing Zone Programme for Nigeria and to
outline conditions necessary for the development of the first Nigerian EPZ on a
. proposed site beside the Port of Calabar. Based on the UNIDO report, the Federal
Government of Nigeria promulgated the Nigeria Export Processing Zones Decree
No. 63 of 19 November, 1992. The said Decree also established the Nigerian Export
Processing Zones Authority. Nigeria's EPZ is essentially fashioned after Taiwan's
EPZ.

Progress on the Calabar EPZ
Following the choice of Calabar as the site for Nigeria's premier EPZ, the
foundation stone for the project was laid on 1 November, 1992. Fenced within an
area of 300 hectares of land, the Calabar EPZ is situated beside the new Calabar Port
Complex and is about 25 kilomet¢rs from the Calabar international airport. The
Federal Government, through the managing agency, the Nigerian Export Processing
Zones Authority, has taken steps to provide the needed facilities for the take-off of
the Zone. The facilities at the Calabar EPZ are at advanced stages of completion.
There are also well laid and wide road network within the Zone. 'The monthly
progress report on facilities at the Zone for the month of May 1995, showed that the
road network and connection of electricity to the national grid had reached 98 per
cent completion stage while the drainage and sewerage and installation of low and
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medium voltage electrical network had reached 95 per cent completion stage. The
construction of water distribution network and fire fighting distribution network
were at 80 per cent completion and work on erosion control project had reached 70
per cent. However, only 40 per cent of telecommunications and civil works was
completed. Installation of telecommunications equipments had not begun but these
equipment had been imported and were awaiting clearance from the port. Also,
the sewage treatment plant was not yet installed.
The major facilities at the 2.one which had on the average reached 75 per cent
compl~tion stages were the generator house, Administration Building,_ Mess Hall,
Customs House, Fire Service Building, the Police Post and theMainterumce Building.
Renovation work on five abandoned buildings which were already in the site at its
inception had also reached advanced stages. They will form part of the pre-built
factory buildings in the.zone. Construction of three high technology factory buildings
was in progress. One of them had reached 90 per cent completion stage while the
other two were at 50 and 14 per cent, respectively. Also, five medium scale factory
buildings and three warehouses were being cortstructed.
The new Calabar Port Complex is expected to play a pivotal role in the Calabar
EPZ. Located on latitude 4° 55 02" N and longitude 8° 15' 20 E, the new port lies
about 93 kilometers from the Fair Ways Bouy and 8 kilometers from the main
channels of the Cross Rivers. It occupies an area of approximately 38 hectares of
land and fully buoyed river channel 80 nautical kilometers long and 150 nautical
kilometers wide. In line with the very important role the Calabar Port has to play in
tne success of the EPZ, additional 34 hectares of land has been acquired along the
shores of the Port to make room for facilities expansion when the need arises. The
Port has also acquired new facilities which include 6 kalmar container landers
ranging from 3 to 28 tons capacity; 2- 4 tons Climax forklift and a heavy duty tug
(M/T Palasa) which helps vessels to berth. The newly acquired facilities are
backed up by other facilities like a 23 tons truck and tractors and cranes which
could be hired by third parties. The Port also has spacious and safe warehouses.
The channel of the Port is currently dredged to 7.6 metres while the area
alongside the berths and turning basins are dredged to 13 metres and 9 metres,
respectively, because of the need to meet-with the requirements of big merchant
vessels that will naturally call when the EPZ takes off.

Socio-Economic Impact of the Calabar EPZ
As pointed out earlier, the main objective for the creation of EPZs is to promote
the development of export-oriented marketing activities To achieve the above
objective, the government has put in place a number of fiscal and administrative
incentives which include:
(i)

the waiver of legislative provisions pertaining to levies, duties and foreign
exchange;
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(ii) tax holiday;
(iii) permission to repatriate foreign capital investment and capital appreciation
in EPZs at any ti.me;
(iv) unrestricted remittance of profits and dividends earned by foreign investors
inEPZs;
(v)) exemption from paying export and import duties;
(vi) rent-free land for factory cnnstrudion; and
(vii) pennission to allow the sale of up to 25 per cent of production in Nigeria.

It is dear from the above that the EPZ as amcieived is likely to make a major
impact on Nigeria's economy. First, from what has happened in other countries
where this method of export promotion has taken place, it is likely to increase foreign
exchange inflows. This could come about through a number of ways. Fll'St, it is
likely to le.ad to an increased inflow of Foreign Dired'lpvesbnent (FOi) as foreign
investors take advantage of the fiscal and administrative incentives to invest in the
Zone. Seamd, it may lead 1n increased export earnings as export capacities are
developed in the Zone. Increased production of tradable ~ufactures and the
cnndition that up to 25 per <lell.t can be sold in the domestic market may also ensure
a reduction in imports. Thus, the EPZ is likely to reduce considerably the balance of
payments pressure and moderate the depreciation of the Naira as exports increase
and imports decline.
1he EPZ may lead to a development of an efficient manufaduring sector. This is
because the quality of goods to be produced in the zone will be of export standard.
Linkages with the domestic economy will ensure efficiency gains in the larger
manufacturing sectors of theec:QIIODly. This is because l ~ o f skills, technologies
and marketing know-how to the larger domestic economy are likely. These were
the case in Taiwan, Malaysia and Mauritius. A corollary to the above is the fad that
the expansionary effect of the envisaged initial employment at the EPZ will also
spill over to the rest of the domestic economy and perhaps start a chain of
employment increasing sequences that may reduce significantly the unemployment
problem of the country. Unlike the employment generation potentials of an import
substitution strategy which dissipates rather rapidly as a result of limitation of the
market, the employment generation potential of the EPZ is only constrained to a
large extent by the limitations of the world market which implies a high employment
potential. Around the world, EPZs have led to a creation of over 1.5 million
employment opportunities for workers. In addition, EPZs would lead to the
generation of improved value-added and increased capacity utilization in industries
as demand rises locally in reaction to improved employment. For example, in the
Massen EPZ in South Korea, production of manufactured goods grew by more than
30 per oent in real terms between 1973 and 1986 and exceeded US$1.5 billion in
1988. In terms of domestic sourcing of inputs, by 1987, more than two thirds of all
EPZ inputs were supplied locally compared to only six per oent in 1971 (Majid,
1992).
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The EPZ is likely to attract technology and lead to the acquisition and upgrading
of management and technical skills. Due to the fact that the zone is going to be free
ftom the wedge between the domestic economy and the rest of the world,
technological developments will naturally be speedily adopted in the zone as firms
tty to match oompetitions with other markets. Management techniques will improve
and will be directed at cost saving and efficiency and linkages with the domestic
economy will ensure that these are transmitted.
There are however, possible negative economic consequences of the EPZ. First,
the set of concessions to be provided to the zone is likely to affect interspatial structure
of incentives thereby leading to regional disparities in income distribution. This
may in tum lead to inter regional tensions. Secondly, since the EPZ emphasizes the
production of exportable manufactures, it may lead to a shift in the incentives system
that may now negatively affect the production of home goods, especially nontradable agricultural commodities. This would now mean that the country may
start importing those goods which it could previously produce at home. The reason
for this is that factors of production may be better rewarded in producing those
goods which are supplied to the EPZ, making mobile factors to move out of less
rewarding sectors to those sectors that are growing as a result of the EPZ. This
phenomenon could be termed "EPZ disease" after the well-known "Dutch disease"
thesis. This explains in part, the co-existence within the economy of progressing
(EPZ sector) and declining or booming and lagging sub-sectors.
Additional negative impact that can also be evaluated along the lines of the socalled "EPZ disease" is the effect on productivity growth as a result of the EPZ on
the real exchange rate and the rest of the domestic economy. If the productivity
growth is Hicks-neutral (i.e. factor ratios remain unchanged if factor prices remain
constant) Diakosavas and Kirpatrick (1990) argued that then production
transformation curve would shift symmetrically upwards. The real exchange rate
in this case might depreciate or appreciate depending on income elasticities of
demand. If expenditure growth is biased towards tradeables, the real exchange
rate will depreciate, and vice versa. If it is Hicks-neutral, the real exchange rate will
be affected directly; if it is biased towards tradables, then the real exchange rate will
tend to appreciate. Since productivity improvements as a result of the EPZ are
expected to be higher in the traqable sector than in the non-tradable sector,
appreciation of the real exchange rate for the whole economy is expected, which
may in the longer-run hurt exports.
Also, the negative social consequences of the EPZ may derive from erosion of the
country's culture as a result of the possible influx of foreign businesses. Eating
habits may also change, while cultural identity may eventually be diluted if not
properly 8'\ard.ed.
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V. EXPORT PROCESSING WNES:
GWBAL EVALUATION AND COUNTRY SPECIFIC EXPERIENCE
About sixty of the eight-six zones in twenty-seven emnomies have been operating
long enough to permit interim judgments about their success. Based on such rough
criteria like employment, exports, value added and net earnings from exports,
industries attracted and foreign investment, twenty-five of these zones appear to be
predominantly successful, another ten come close, seven are partly successful and
eighteen are clearly unsuccessful. Mostof the unsuccessful ones date from the 1970s,
when economies were experimenting with this instrument3.
According to the World Bank (1993), almost all the successful EPZs are in the
Asia region (eighteen of them) or in the Dominican Republic and Jamaica, where at
least six appear predominantly successful, six are on the verge of success, and the
others are new. Elsewhere, there is only one other clear-cut EPZ success (a small
private zone at Cartago in Costa Rica), three zones are partly successful, and as
many as fourteen are unsuccessful. The twenty-seven zones in these other parts of
the world employed only 25,000 people in 1990, or less than 1,000 per EPZ;
comparable figures for Asia are 10,500 and about 6,000 for the Dominican Republic
and Jamaica.
Two zones are rated poorly. These are Kandla in India, which requires constant
subsidies (because of high transport costs) and artificial pricing of output (exported
mainly in barter trade with the USSR), and Bataan in the Philippines which had
enormous infrastructure and other oonstruction oosts because of its inappropriate
location. Most zones that are considered partly successful have achieved only a partial
ocrupancy rate, and most of the unsua:essful zones have remained virtually unoa:upied.
Using EPZs to promote development in background regions had generally led to very
poor results.
Employment
Employment in EPZs in developing economies reached about 530,000 people in
1990. Of this labour force, roughly 71 per cent is in Asia, 21 per cent in the Dominican
Republic, 7 per cent in Latin America and the Caribbean, and 1 per cent in the rest of
the developing world. Exceptions include Taiwan (China), at over 45 per cent, and
the Masan Zone in Korea, at 51 per cent. Of the 25 per cent or so of value added in
a zone, typically at least half is labour costs; others include payments for rent, utility,
transport, services and goods inside the country; while some go to the owners and
their creditors (including equipment supplies) abroad. Thus, net foreign-owned
EPZ plant may be as low as 15 to 20 per cent of the value of the exports.
Exports
In most of the developing economies, manufactured exports, which totalled $258
billion in 1988, came from firms that enjoyed tree trade status through duty
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exemption or duty draw-back systems with in-bond systems ranking third and EPZ,
fourth. The exports from fenced-in EPZs in 1988 were $11 billion to $13 billion or 4
to 5 per cent of total4 • About 80 per cent of EPZ exports were from Malaysia, Korea
and Taiwan.

Industries Attracted and Foreign Investment
EPZs concentrate their exports and employment in few labour intensive industries,
with two main patterns. In the first pattern, electronics predominates, as in Korea,
Malaysia and Taiwan. Other precision industries are usually present as well, while
garments account for about 10 to 15 per cent of employment. In the second pattern,
garment manufacturing predominates, as in most of the zones in Bangladesh, the
Dominican Republic , Indonesia, Jamaica, and Sri Lanka. Foreign owned firms and
their joint ventures predominate in most EPZs.

Exchange Rates and Macroeconomic Stability
Success in developing EPZs has been definitely correlated with realistic exchange
rates and stable macroeconomic policies. Five of the nine Asian economies with
EPZs - Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan (China) and Thailand-have maintained
fully realistic exchange. rates. Their average inflation rate for 1980-1988 ran~ed from
1.3 per cent for Malaysia, to 8.5 per cent for Indonesia.

Country Specific Experience
As noted earlier, Nigeria's EPZ is modelled after the Taiwan's EPZ. To that extent,
our analysis in this segment essentially concentrates on Taiwan and Mauritius.
Mauritius is selected for in-depth study because it is the African success story.
Principally, factors that are responsible for their success are identified. In broad
terms, experience suggests that certain policies at the macroeconomic level and
policies specifically affecting EPZs are important for their success. On the
macroeconomic level, a realistic exchange rate and a stable macroeconomic
environment are prerequisites for all manufactured exports. For policies affecting
firms in the EPZ, key factors are:
a dear foreign investment policy regime (including the possibility of 100 per
cent foreign ownership and guarantee profit repatriation);
(ii) restriction-free and duty-free access to imported inputs and capital goods;
(iii) rapid, low-cost customs clearance for imports and exports;
(iv) a completely liberalized foreign exchange regime for EPZ firm's export-oriented
international transactions;
(v) speedy responses to uncompleted investment applications;
(vi) minimal regulatory control of actions and transactions within the EPZ
(including freedom to hire and fire workers at low transaction costs);

(i)
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(vii) extension of free trade status to EPZ estate development and management.
On the industrial estate side, key factors include:

(a)
(b)
(c)

(d)

appropriate site selection and location; generally in a major urban area,
well provided with stable, low-cost labour;
utilities (electricity, water, sewerage, and reliable telecommunications)
and services (maintenance, security, banking);
good zone administration and management (including phased
construction of suitable factory spaces for rent as well as complementary
facilities); and
appropriate promotional efforts.

On the other hand, Warr (1989) observed that operational failures of EPZs most

frequently stem from poor site selection, economies with unfavourable business
environments or poor trade infrastructure, poor management, and inadequate
promotion. Another contributing influence has been excess capacity building in
EPZs industrial estates, but this has become less frequent. Policy failure of EPZs
include the tardy formulation of required policies, an over-regulated and rigid
business environment, ineffective implementation of EPZ laws and regulations, and
lack of follow-up on further trade reforms.

CASE STUDIES
Taiwan EPZ
Taiwan (China) already had fast-growing manufactured exports based on sound
export policies when it started its first EPZ in 1965. It had created an excellent
draw-back and exemption regime known as a rebate and rebate-on-account system
in 1955 and had followed that up with exchange rate and macroeconomic policy
reforms. As early as 1956, it had begun to study Puerto Rico's industrial estates.
However, the trade regime still had a vast array of hidden and open quantitative
import controls. Also, generally high tariffs and regulatory regimes were still too
restrictive and complex to appeal to investors from developed economies.
The Kaohsiung EPZ was an instant success, and by late 1970, four years after it
shipped out its first exports, it had 162 firms and about 40,000 workers. Also by
then, a second EPZ had been inaugurated and a third was nearing completion. EPZ
exports never constituted much more than eight per cent of total export and
contributed some of the earliest foreigrt investment from developed economies to
the development of technically demanding industries.
Taiwan (China) went on to achieve phenomenal export success, including a
remarkable diversification away from garments. ln the 1970s, it began to liberalise
its policies, and in the 1980s it undertook a dramatic and sweeping liberaliution of
its imports. Confidence and know-how acquired from the EPZs seem to have
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contributed significantly to these achievements and to a convergence of the policy
environment inside and outside the zones.

Mauritius EPZ
Mauritius is a tiny island located in the Indian Ocean on the South and Eastern
flank of Africa. In many respects, it is a bridge between the African continent and
the Indian sub-continent. The EPZ in Mauritius typifies the attitude in the majority
of developing countries that EPZ establishment should go unabated. This is pertinent
in that the natural resource endowment of Mauritius is far less than a number of
sub-Saharan African countries, including Nigeria. The success is almost entirely
attributable to determination which resulted in the diversification of the primary
sugar-based economy into an export-oriented producers of manufactures. As
indicated earlier, the Mauritius EPZ was launched in the 1960s with government
embarking on a programme of diversification of the primary sugar-based economy
into an export-oriented producers of manufacture in the 1960s, but with experience,
the thrust shifted to an outward-looking policy. The establishment of an EPZ served
as the centerpiece, and in 1970, the necessary legislative framework was created.
Apparently, the package of incentives offered and the political and social stability
in Mauritius were very critical to the success of their EPZs. The package offered by
Mauritius attracted foreign investors from all over the world, with Hong Kong
accounting for about two thirds of investment in the mid-1980s, followed by France.
However, particularly in the early stage, nearly all the funds came from domestic
sources. The main export markets being the EEC and USA. One of the most attractive
aspects of the EPZ was the labour market. The availability of tmrplus labour. was
indeed an important incentive, coupled with its geographical location.
In addition to the above, the following fiscal and financial incentives were
particularly relevant:
(a) Income tax relief and exemption from custom duties on EPZ-related imports
and exports;
(b) Infrastructure: The Mauritius EPZ is not restricted to designated industrial
estates or enclave -as is typically the case - but is instead dispersed throughout
the Island. This arrangement was made possible by the already existing
infrastructure, and has benefited investors, workers, and the environment. The
majority of firms had ready-made industrial estates at subsidized rates until
the mid-1980s, and also enjoyed subsidized electricity tariffs. Progress of the
EPZ in Mauritius could be analyzed under four time-frames:
(i)

(ii)

1970-1977: At the launching of the EPZ legislation, investment,
employment and export expanded vigorously, benefiting greatly from
high local investments.
1978-1982: This period witnessed external and internal problems.
Expansion continued but at a much slower pace. The number of
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companies fell, but then picked up again while employment slowly rose.
For most of these years, foreign investment did not play a major role.
(ii) 1983-1988:Revival of the boom. The EPZ once again expanded rapidly.
The number of companies surged, employment grew and foreign
investment became a major factor.
(iv) 1988 to date: Consolidation and re-orientation - a direct recovery in the
EPZ performance including strengthening of the textile sector and
progress in diversification.
Why the EPZs Work
From the discussion above, it is clear that the level of successes recorded in our
case-study countries could be attributed to:
(a)
(b)

the normal pre-conditions as stated earlier;
the macroeconomic conditions and external environment which were found
to be critical. They were decisive against a background of political stability, a
continuity of social and economic policies and government's unflinching
support.

The Nigerian EPZ: The Journey So Far
The urgent question to be asked on the Nigerian EPZ are: Does the country have
the normal pre-conditions in place? Are the existing macroeconomic policy mix,
political environment and social policies conducive for an EPZ? An attempt will be
made in the remaining part of this segment to evaluate these issues. The nature and
extent of incentives available in Nigeria's EPZ scheme compares favourably with
those provided by EPZ schemes elsewhere, including the case-study countries cited
above. However, the task of the Nigerian Export Processing Zones Authority
(NEPZA) is to make sure that, in practice, the implementation of the scheme is such
that would conform with the provisions of the 1.-w and policy intentions.
Concerning infrastructure, communications as well as other support facilities,
what Nigeria has on ground presently is less than adequate. Without adequate
support facilities and services that are essential to a successful implementation of
an EPZ scheme, an industrial establishment in the Zone can hardly succeed. On the
basis of this realisation, we should start with a recognition of the traditional spheres
of government responsibility which include:
(i)

(ii)

Public Security and Maintenance of Law and Order. The presence of a good
security system is a basis for earning public confidence in the efficacy of
government machinery in general and its judicial system in particular. Together,
they constitute the foundation upon which public confidence in an enduring
social welfare is built for the common benefit of the citizenry, and the sine qua
non of foreign investment to promote and sustain economic development.
Basic infrastructure, notably in the form of power supply, communications
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and transportation. In Nigeria, the central power authority (otherwise known
as NEPA) is seen to be among the list of very badly run public entities. NITEL
and NIPOST are the main operators in the country's communications sector
today, but their services can hardly be described as efficient. Transportation
network for convenient, easy and safe access to, as well as inter-changeable
links with other locations by road or by water are inadequate.
Judging by the characteristically poor performance of the few examples of our
public enterprises discussed above, it could be concluded that successive
governments have not successfully managed the affclirs of these corporations even
if only the quality of services to the public is taken as the yardstick and the return
on investment in monetary terms is ignored.
Political stability, though hard to quantify in economics, plays a very vital role in
any programme that seeks to attract foreign investors, including EPZs. The purpose
of zone d~cation for the establishment of export-oriented industries is to attract
foreign investment as an impetus for rapid industrialization of the non-oil export
potentials. The main fulcrum on which foreign investment attraction rotates is
confidence, nurtured by generous and reliable package of promised incentives that
can be reasonably, expeditiously and easily delivered once the conditions are met.
To an ~trepreneur, confidence means only one thing: safety of his life and
investment, coupled with a reliable assurance of his freedom, without let or
hindrance, to repatriate his capital and or the return on his irtvestment whenever he
wants to on tenn.s mutually agreed, ab initio, with the host country, and which term
should not be susceptible to unilateral changes by government, irrespective of which
particular Administration may be in power at any point in time. Government
policies must also be reasonably consistent. Experience have shown that a stable
society in a democratic setting under a free..market economy is the most reliable
and re-assuring base for investment. A stable political atmosphere is quite easily
the most effective and least expensive form of propaganda any country in quest of
foreign investment can have. Nigeria can hardly boast of meeting these conditions,
especially in recent times.

VI. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUDING
REMARKS
Policy Recommendations
From our analysis ab9ve, it is very clear th_at Nigeria's EPZ stands to gain from
the experience of o~er q,untri~, especially Taiwan and Mauritius as discussed in
this paper. l:lqwever, _in ord,er tq fully reap the benefits of these experiences_we
outline the following recommendations:
(i)

Infrastructures: The road network that links Calabar EPZ to both the
Northern Nigeria and the West Eastern states should be dualised in order to

710

CBN ECONOMIC & FINANCIAL REVIEW, VOL. 34, NO. 3 ,

cater for the heavy duty vehicles that will be commuting the EPZ, either to
deliver raw materials or to evacuate the approved domestic finished product
sales to the domestic market.
(ii) The telecommunications system in Calabar, Uyo, Aba and other major towns
around the EPZ should be digitalized to make for easy communication.
(iii) Facilities at the Calabar international airport should be upgraded in order to
accommodate big aircraft from around the world which would either lift the
finished product to markets or bring raw materials and or spare parts from
abroad.
(iv) There is also the urgent need to extent the eastern railway lines to Calabar for
easy transportation of heavy equipments.
(v) A major characteristic of all successful EPZs is the existence of credible
institutional arrangements to administer the various components of the scheme.
Where these do not exist, the prospect of such a scheme are significantly
reduced. In this connection, the Nigerian Export ~rocessing Zones Authority
(NEPZA) has a crucial role to play in the success of the EPZ programme. Its
management and operations should be devoid of the usual bureaucratic
bottlenecks. Other relevant government agencies such as the foreign missions
and the customs should ensure the existence of an appropriate enabling
environment for the success of the EPZ programme through timely issuance
of visas and effective monitoring of the scheme for mmpliance with laid down
procedures, etc. Also, the Nigeria Ports Authority should ensure the provision
of adequate port services at compelitive rates.
Above all, a stable macroeconomic and political environment as well as exchange
rate stability have been identified as crucial factors in engendering investors'
confidence. Thus, for continuous attraction of foreign investors to the EPZ
programme, the current efforts at stabilising the value of the Naira and greater
liberalisation of the economy should be sustained.
Concluding Remarks
EPZs now face stronger international competition. This is likely to increase,
especially given the new investment opportunities in Eastern Europe, putting even
more pressure on existing and new host countries to ensure favourable macroeconomic conditions and offer even more generous incentives in financial and fiscal
terms. Particular attention will have to be paid to facilitating administrative
procedures for investors. In all, Nigeria's EPZ offers one of the'best chances for
industrial investment in Africa because of its large market, central location, low
wage structure, availability of raw materials and the country's membership of
ECOWAS.
.
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NOTES:
1. World Bank (1993). The East Asian Mirade,Economic Growth and Public Policy,
Oxford University Press. p.135.
2. Ibid.
3. World Bank (1993). Policy Research Series, No. 2.
4. Value added in EPZ.S is oommonly around 25 per cent or slightly less, particularly
where zones import almost all their material inputs.
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